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Illicit Acquisition and Russia

European Sanctions and Export Control Society

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Agenda

World of Illicit Acquisition

Foreign Direct Investment

Cyber Threats

Intelligence Collection

Illicit Procurement

Order

Payment

Shipping

Case Studies

Prevention and Risk Mitigation



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Illicit Acquisition



World of Illicit Acquisition and Counterproliferation

Above the Surface **Overt Activities**

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COMPANY B

- **COMPANY** A
- Subpoenas

Outreaches

- Procurement
- Press Releases
- Export Controls

- - **COMPANY** C
- Methods of Order Listings
 - **Trade Restrictions**
 - Is Informed Letters
 - End-Use Checks

- Regulations
- Criminal and Admin Investigations
- Methods of Shipping
- Methods of Payment
- Sanctions

- Intelligence Collection
- Measure and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)
- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) _
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
- **Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)**
- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
- **Below the Surface Covert Activities**

- Inter-Agency Cooperation _
- Cyber Intrusions
- **Covert Enforcement Operations**
- **Undercover** Operations
- **Counterintelligence** Operations
- Targeting of Critical Program Information
- Multilateral Approaches to Licensing Reviews _
- Government Sharing of Information
- **Outbound Inspections**
- Monitoring
- **Tracking Shipments**

- Espionage _
- Theft of Trade Secrets
- Recruiting of Witting and Unwitting Sources
- Sabotage
- Exploitation
- Disruption
- Diversion
- IP Theft




Multi-Pronged Approach to Illicit Acquisition

The acquisition of a company's critical products, technology and systems (PTS), critical program information (CPI) and intellectual property (IP) is targeted in <u>four</u> ways.

Foreign Direct Investment

- Acquire companies in critical industries
- Extract CPI
- Circumvent preventative proxies



Tangible Commodities, Systems, Equipment

- Front Companies
- Diversion
- Separated Transactions

Methods of Collecting Intelligence

- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
- Measures and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)
- Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)



What is Critical Program Information?

Critical Program Information, or CPI, can be defined as a company's elements that contribute to technical competitive advantage, and that, if compromised, could undermine a company's current and future market share and profitability.

Critical Program Information

process in foreign th control at

The protection of a company's Critical Program Information (CPI) is a three-part process including enhanced cyber security, foreign threat protection and a robust export control and sanctions program.

Intellectual Property	Reference Material	Staff	IT Networks	Software Programs Used	Development Locations	Contractors
Service Offerings	Algorithms	Hardware	Suppliers	Maintenance Equipment	Training Equipment	Training Programs



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Foreign Direct Investment



Foreign Direct Investment

- Directly acquire companies in prominent industries
- Establish companies in foreign countries to build and grow, then buy out other companies
- List on the stock exchange to gain capital from the U.S.
- Government subsidizing in certain industries, in certain regions of the world, to gain market share for intelligence and revenue generation reasons.





FDI Case Study – Momentus and Stable Road

- The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission said the companies and Stable Road Acquisition Company Chief Executive Brian Kabot agreed to pay \$8 million to resolve allegations they misled investors about Momentus Inc.'s technology and national security risks associated with its former CEO Mikhail Kokorich.
 - U.S. concerns with Kokorich's connections to Russian government.
 - Momentus sought to merge with Stable Road.
 - Became publicly traded to obtain capital.
 - Fined for violations to cover for national security risks.
 - New CEO assigned.





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Intelligence Collection



5 Intelligence Disciplines



Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)






Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)





Measures and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)





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


Intelligence Officers and Industry











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 \bigcirc Trade \bigcirc Associations



Businessmen (Recruited vs. Implanted)



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Cyber Threats




Russian Cyber Activities

Historic Examples

- Presidential Election Hacking (GRU)
- U.S. Defense Contractors (Hacker groups)
- Global Energy Sector (FSB)
- Oil and Gas (Triton malware)
- Satellites
- DDOS attack on Topeka 501 District

Methods

- Selling computer networking equipment
- Selling software, back door updates
- FSB and encryption
- Development of apps
- Social media
- Ransomware





Cyber Intrusion Goals

Attempted Acquisition of Technology

- Critical Program Information (CPI)
- Information regarding equipment
- Diagrams
- Schematics
- Plans
- Spec sheets
- User Manuals

Collection and Exploitation

- Targeting for recruitment
- Sabotage
- Disruption
- Military modernization
- Collecting intelligence information
- Extraction of data






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Illicit Procurement








Most Frequently Targeted Commodities (Historically)

Commodities:

- Microelectronics
- Semiconductors
- Semiconductor manufacturing equipment
- Night vision
- Thermal vision
- Scopes
- Aircraft parts
- Computer networking devices
- Encryption
- Deep sea submersible equipment
- Underwater communication equipment


Uses:

- Missiles
- Torpedoes
- Space program
- Special Forces
- Military modernization
- Underwater monitoring
- Secure communications
- Security services
- Chemical, Biological, Nuclear weapons






Separated Transactions





Procurement Attacks






Organized Crime, Oligarchs, Funding for Illicit Acquisition

- To fund illicit acquisition supporting military modernization and development, the Russian government uses a multipronged approach to raising money.
- Oligarchs and organized criminal syndicates make contributions to the Russian government directly through SOEs as well as certain companies under government influence. These contributions can provide capital to government sponsored procurement networks funding intelligence services, illicit acquisition, and military operations.





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Diversion Risks



Historic Russian Shipment Routes



Children of

CONSULTING

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Future Risk of Diversion

- Building Partnerships with other Countries (Iran, China, NK, and others)
- Asian Networks Established
- Eurasian Customs Union (EACU)
 - Armenia Included in Commerce Country Group D, with case-by-case license review policy for civil end users/uses. No license requirements at all for any exports of U.S.-origin items controlled only for AT reasons.
 - Belarus Sanctioned (See Available License Exceptions)
 - Kazakhstan Included in Commerce Country Group D, with case-by-case license review policy for civil end users/uses. No license requirements at all for any exports of U.S.-origin items controlled only for AT reasons.
 - **Kyrgyzstan** Included in Commerce Country Group D, with case-by-case license review policy for civil end users/uses. No license requirements at all for any exports of U.S.-origin items controlled only for AT reasons.
 - **Russia** Sanctioned (See Available License Exceptions)

Board of Directors Remarks – Items exported to these areas as ultimate consignees or end-users can be subject to diversion and sent to Russia and provided to sanctioned and/or listed entities with minimal insight from government and industry.



Use of Third-Party Countries for License Exceptions

- The use of license exceptions to export certain commodities to authorized destinations can result in the risk of diversion.
- Whereas a policy of denial exists to send certain sensitive commodities to Russia, illicit acquisition networks can seek to obtain items from the U.S. using license exceptions to companies in Europe and Asia listed as ultimate consignees and then divert items directly or indirectly to Russia.

CIV – Civilian Use

- **APP** Computers
- LVS Limited Value Shipment
- **STA** Strategic Trade Authorization
- GFT Gift Parcels and Donations
- APR Additional Permissive Re-Exports
- **RPL** Replacement Parts and Equipment
- AGR Agricultural Commodities
- TSR Technology and Software Under Restriction



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Recent Case Studies



Stockholm, Sweden





The Swedes: Russian couple arrested in Stockholm has ties to GRU and Swedish military intelligence, lives next door to Skripals' poisoner

28 November 2022



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What can we do?



Recommendations

- Think like a counterintelligence/counterespionage agent
- Develop a **risk-based** approach to a compliance program
- Display positive commitments to compliance
- Conduct business with members of trade associations, to include logistics/freight forwarders with displayed commitments to compliance
- Train employees on risk-based approaches
- Promote training for members of supply chains
- Identify and database red flags
- Report red flags and suspicious activities
- Conduct a 5 year look back VSDs
- Identify critical areas to allocate limited resources avoid over-compliance



Efficient Allocation of Resources

Identifying Resource Focus

Acquisition Needs of Unauthorized Governments Organized Crime Terrorist Groups

Correlate

RESOURCE ALLOCATION (The 4 Cs)

- <u>C</u>atalog what products and services a company offers,
- <u>C</u>orrelate to the acquisition needs of nefarious entities,
- <u>C</u>ompare to multilateral regulations, and
- <u>C</u>onsider the priorities and capabilities of enforcement agencies.

Tip: Avoid over compliance

Multinational Jurisdictional Regulatory Risk

Compare

High Risk

Multilateral Enforcement Priorities and Capabilities Consider

Catalog

Products, Services, Business Operations





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Future Special Training Sessions

Illicit Acquisition and China Illicit Acquisition and Iran Diversion Case Studies Intelligence and Export Controls and Sanctions Compliance

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Questions

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